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NO-LIMIT TEXAS HOLD ‘EM, 
OR, THE VOIR DIRE IN DALLAS COUNTY 
Jeffrey Kahn† 
OIR DIRE IS LAW FRENCH for “to speak the truth.”1 In the 
United States and a few other common-law countries 
that still use juries, the term describes the process of 
selecting jurors who will hear the evidence presented at 
trial, render a verdict, and sometimes determine punishment. The 
† Jeffrey Kahn is an Assistant Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University. Copyright 
© 2010 Jeffrey Kahn. 
1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009). Pronunciation varies. In New 
York, “voir dire” rhymes with “fois gras and beer.” In Dallas, “voir dire” rhymes 
with “more wire.” Transcripts do not aid non-Law French speakers. The Texan 
who argued Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754 (1989), apologized for his patois: 
MR. PALMER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: At the outset 
I’d like to apologize to the Court. In Texas we pronounce some of these legal 
terms differently than the Court is used to, and if our pronunciations sound 
odd to the Court, I’m sorry for that. I would also like to first discuss the Beck 
issue. 
UNIDENTIFIED JUSTICE: You’ve argued cases here before, haven’t you? 
MR. PALMER: I beg your pardon, Your Honor? 
UNIDENTIFIED JUSTICE: Have you argued cases here before? 
MR. PALMER: Yes, but I’ve never had to use the word “voir dire”, for in-
stance. 
UNIDENTIFIED JUSTICE: Okay. [Laughter] So it’s not a general admoni-
tion, but just about voir dire. 
A month later, he was welcomed back with gentle chiding: “Mr. Palmer, we’ll 
hear now from you. You don’t have to worry about pronouncing voir dire in 
this.” Oral Argument, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  
V 
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translation suggests a search for jurors who can render a fair and 
impartial verdict. Attorneys try to discover and remove jurors who 
seem unable or unlikely to speak the truth, such as those who nur-
ture irrational prejudices or harbor private grievances.  
In most federal courts, the judge is the primary conduit for in-
teraction with the venire.2 In most state courts, attorneys enjoy 
more direct engagement with jurors.3 Naturally enough, lawyers 
like to select jurors who seem to like them, like their clients, or like 
their point of view (the trifecta is predictably rare). This seems per-
fectly reasonable to most observers.4 Jury consultants do a brisk 
trade.  
Texas has juries and a Texan version of voir dire. I know. I had a 
front row seat (actually, seat number 39 out of 77) for a two-day 
voir dire in the 194th District Court of Dallas County, the Honor-
able Ernest White presiding.5 I knew just enough theory to be a 
danger to the attorneys who questioned me. I had no knowledge of 
local practice. My conception of voir dire – memories from a clerk-
ship in a federal district court in Manhattan – was jarred by the ex-
perience.6  
This Essay dissects the transcript of that voir dire, which re-
corded my reactions.7 The transcript also recorded, I hasten to add, 
the reactions of the judge, district attorney and defense counsel, all 
2 THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 34 (6th ed. 2002) (“In recent years the 
trend, particularly in federal courts, has been for the judge to conduct the entire 
voir dire examination.”). 
3 Id. (“Traditionally the lawyers conduct the entire voir dire examination.”). 
4 ABA AMERICAN JURY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS Principle 
11.B.2 (2005) (“Following initial questioning by the court, each party should
have the opportunity, under the supervision of the court and subject to reason-
able time limits, to question jurors directly, both individually and as a panel.”).
5 Texans elect their judges. How this affects the judge-lawyer-jury triangle is a 
subject best left for the day when I’ve seen more judicial elections than jury selec-
tions. As this essay suggests, I just blew into town.  
6 This may also be because courtrooms are “venues seldom visited by those who 
write legal articles.” James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of Rule 808, Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 165, 165 (2009). 
7 I have altered some spellings, omissions, and punctuation for clarity’s sake. 
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of whom exhibited great skill and agility in the courtroom. As the 
transcript shows, we didn’t always see eye to eye on the process in 
which we played our different roles.8 
BACKGROUND: STATE V. RANDALL MCMURPHY 
he case was styled State v. Randall McMurphy.9 Mr. McMurphy 
appeared for trial to answer two indictments that accused him 
of the criminal violation of a state court’s civil order that he be 
committed to an out-patient treatment program for sexually violent 
predators. The indictments alleged that he violated this order “by 
possessing a cellular phone and by possessing contraband,” and by 
“being discharged from his Sex Offender Treatment Program.”10  
The court order was based on a provision of the Texas Health 
and Safety Code that establishes a process for the civil commitment 
of anyone whom the state designates as a “sexually violent preda-
tor”.11 As Mr. McMurphy was nearing the end of a prison sentence, 
a state committee determined that he was afflicted with a “behav-
ioral abnormality” that predisposed him to commit a violent sexual 
crime.12 A trial followed in a district court in Montgomery County 
                                                                                                
8 Full disclosure: This research was partially funded by the State of Texas, which 
paid me $46.00 for jury service. I assert that my views were not tainted by this 
filthy lucre. But see Yes, Minister, “Doing the Honours,” BBC Series 2, Episode 2 
(Mar. 2, 1981) (“The surprising thing about academics is not that they have their 
price, but how low that price is.”) (hat-tip to Professor Gerard Magliocca). 
9 Excepting Judge White and Ms. Baraka, the excellent court reporter, all names 
have been changed to protect the innocent, presumed innocent, guilty, and 
(keeping with the western venue) the good, the bad, and the ugly. 
10 True Bill Indictments F08-00831 and F08-00834 (Grand Jury of Dallas County, 
Texas, July 2008 Term). The latter accusation appears to mean discharge for a 
reason other than successful completion. 
11 Texas Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, 11 TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 841 (West 2007). The Texas Supreme Court upheld the 
statute against due process and other challenges. See In re Commitment of Fisher, 
164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 (2005).  
12 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.002(2) (West 2007) (“‘Behavioral 
abnormality’ means a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a per-
son’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexu-
T 
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(where by law all such trials occur).13 Although the trial is deemed 
civil in nature, the statute requires that findings be made “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,”14 the burden of proof in criminal cases. McMur-
phy was found to be a repeat sexually violent offender whose behav-
ioral abnormality made him “likely to engage in a predatory act of 
sexual violence.”15 The court therefore ordered him to successfully 
complete an outpatient treatment program. In order to ensure 
McMurphy’s compliance and to protect the community, the statute 
required the court to order McMurphy to reside in a residential 
facility approved by the state, wear tracking equipment, and com-
ply with a long list of other restrictions.16  
The indictment’s seemingly modest charges disguised very high 
stakes, for although McMurphy was deemed an outpatient under a 
civil commitment order to treat a congenital or acquired condition, 
we were told that he could face up to 99 years in prison if found 
guilty of violating the court’s order. The jurors would hold the rest 
of McMurphy’s life in their hands.  
This jury, like all juries, possessed great power. It is hard to 
imagine a more direct expression of popular control over the state, 
which must seek a jury’s  agreement to exact punishment for viola-
tion of its law. Courts are very careful, therefore, to control this 
potent force. Judges instruct juries on the law and order jurors to 
follow their instructions. Jurors take oaths. Judges sequester juries.  
Judges also filter information through rules of evidence so that 
only relevant and admissible evidence reaches the jury. The Texas 
                                                                                                
ally violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health 
and safety of another person.”). A state-contracted expert advises the committee. 
§ 841.023(a). Only prisoners who are repeat sexually violent offenders are eligi-
ble for review. The act for which the person is currently imprisoned need not be 
a sexually violent crime. The statutory definition includes acts to which a defen-
dant has successfully pleaded nolo contendere or not guilty by reason of insanity. 
§ 841.003(b)(1).  
13 §§ 841.041(a), 841.061(a). 
14 § 841.062(a). 
15 Id. (tracking definition of “sexually violent predator” in § 841.003).  
16 § 841.082. 
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Rules of Criminal Evidence apply to voir dire.17 And yet during this 
voir dire, Rule 103(c), which requires that “proceedings shall be 
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible 
evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means,” seemed 
honored in the breach. I offer three examples: (1) polluting the 
pool; (2) coercive commitments; and (3) appeals to false authority. 
POLLUTING THE POOL 
udge White welcomed us to his courtroom and administered our 
oath. He gave a concise and helpful description of the steps in a 
criminal trial and explained a few legal terms. Judge White also 
gave an important limiting instruction: “[W]e cannot go into the 
facts of the case during voir dire. The law prohibits us from going 
into the facts. Outside of the indictment, I can’t tell you nor [can] 
the attorneys anything regarding the facts. A lot of things you may 
be asked are essentially hypotheticals. But unfortunately the law 
does not allow us to go into the facts at this time. So you just have 
to bear with us in that regard because we can’t go any further than 
that.” 
That restriction made sense to me. I understood voir dire as a 
mechanism to prevent the seating of a juror who already had a pre-
conceived idea of the “facts.” That juror might decide the case based 
on something other than admissible evidence or, worse, pollute the 
deliberations of his fellow jurors. We were blank slates, empty ves-
sels to be filled only by relevant and admissible evidence.18 Of 
course, this idealized view isn’t shared by many jury consultants or 
litigators, who have come to expect ulterior benefits from the proc-
ess.19  
                                                                                                
17 Watson v. State, 917 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex.App. – Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d). 
18 Some of us might have been chipped slates or cracked vessels, but still blank and 
empty where it counts. 
19 “[T]he foremost goal of voir dire is to gather information by getting the jurors to 
talk. Secondary goals include building rapport, indoctrination (when permitted) 
and inoculation.” Cindy K. Andrews, Voir Dire Strategies for Success, 780 PLI/LIT 
207, 209 (2008).  
J 
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Thus, I expected voir dire to continue as before: Judge White 
would ask us questions that he and the attorneys had drafted in ad-
vance. That had been my experience in federal court and it made 
sense to me that the attorneys should be allowed to begin active 
advocacy only once the jury had been selected. That is not the tradi-
tion in Texas. To my surprise, when we returned from lunch, 
Judge White settled into his chair and prepared for a long after-
noon: “I now turn it over to the attorneys. You may proceed, Ms. 
Fletcher.”  
From that moment, I sensed that the cool, clear waters of justice 
in which I’d languidly been bathing all morning (expecting them to 
roll on like a river, or even a mighty stream, once we’d picked the 
jury),20 were becoming increasingly muddied by debris chucked in 
by the attorneys. The pool wasn’t polluted so much by jurors’ an-
swers, which were generally thoughtful and attentive, as by the at-
torneys’ lengthy lectures between questions. 
The prosecutor, Ms. Fletcher, began by describing her objec-
tive: “I am looking for 12 fair and impartial people”. This she soon 
revealed had a special meaning: “Because who here like[s] sex of-
fenders?” Ms. Fletcher explained that it was natural to have strong 
feelings and yet still sit on the jury. Ms. Fletcher clearly had strong 
feelings about sex offenders. She repeated the phrase “violent sexual 
predator” so frequently that I feared it would lodge in my brain like 
an unwanted pop song. 
Ms. Fletcher next gave a detailed analysis of the civil commit-
ment statute. Having already reassured us that our shared loathing 
of (undefined) sex offenders was reasonable, she explained how 
carefully and scientifically the law identified this group and how it 
protected society.21 She described the rules that the state required 
sex offenders to obey as “very black and white … there is no gray 
area.” The rigidity she ascribed to this legal framework would make 
                                                                                                
20 Cf. Amos 5:24 (NIV). 
21 Ms. Fletcher: “Then they are moved into that behavioral abnormality assessment 
by an expert psychologist to determine whether that person had a behavioral 
abnormality that makes them likely to engage in a predator act of sexual vio-
len[ce].” 
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girders envious. She appeared to know the law backwards and for-
wards and took us through it in both directions, repeatedly. 
The defense attorney, Mr. Nicholson, was no better, or, I 
should say, just as good. He argued against this reading of the stat-
ute, and he did his job well, introducing much gray into the previ-
ously black-and-white picture. He recounted the law’s history, its 
retroactivity (“some people use the term double jeopardy”), and its 
outlier status compared to laws in other states. We heard examples 
of arbitrariness in the making of the rules. Mr. Nicholson claimed 
that no one had ever successfully completed and been released from 
treatment.  
The defense never objected to Ms. Fletcher’s performance, and 
Mr. Nicholson seemed destined for similar courtesy, until he over-
stepped. Mr. Nicholson expressed his frustration that his client had 
been branded with such a damning phrase. He noted that we “keep 
hearing the word sexually violent predator. And let me tell you, 
when the legislation was originally passed, that language was not 
used –.” The prosecutor objected: this legal history was irrelevant. 
Hollywood’s finest could not have scripted a better courtroom dia-
logue: 
PROSECUTION: Objection, relevancy. 
COURT: Sustained. 
PROSECUTION: Ask the jury to disregard. 
JUROR: What comment? 
COURT: [Smiling to juror] You did very well. You may pro-
ceed, Mr. Nicholson. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Thank you, Judge. 
JUROR: I’m serious, what comment am I disregarding[?] 
COURT: The comment made about the language not being in 
the – in the statute originally[.] 
JUROR: Okay, thank you. 
COURT: Now disregard that.  
The courtroom erupted in laughter. Mr. Nicholson’s irrelevant 
suggestion of legislative malice had now been etched in our memo-
ries, twice.  
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Though humorous, the episode illustrates the problem of pollut-
ing the jury pool with information inadmissible at trial. What possi-
ble relevance could the attorneys’ personal observations, their riffs 
on legal history, or slanted claims about the law’s operation have to 
the issues presented in the indictments: did McMurphy, while un-
der court-ordered treatment, possess contraband and was he dis-
charged from his program? Even if relevant, how were their asser-
tions admissible? Both sides wanted to portray the law a certain way 
with their own personal glosses on it. But if they could not do this 
in their cases-in-chief, why were the rules of evidence relaxed in 
voir dire? Their speeches were not needed to exercise their chal-
lenges intelligently. The attorneys were arguing their cases, not 
assaying the venire.  
It was hard to see the point of dutifully filtering testimony at 
trial through rules of evidence after learning so much information 
from the lawyers in voir dire. 
COERCIVE COMMITMENTS 
 commitment question extracts a public statement that the 
juror will decide an issue a particular way. The question typi-
cally comes in the form of a yes-or-no hypothetical. Answered in 
open court, recorded by a court reporter, the answer feels like a 
promise, and not always one freely made.  
In Texas, questions designed “to bind or commit a prospective 
juror to a verdict based upon a hypothetical set of facts” are prohib-
ited when they seek to extract a commitment that the law does not 
require a juror to make.22 There is nothing objectionable, for ex-
ample, in eliciting a juror’s commitment to consider the full range 
of punishment for the charged crime. In fact, Ms. Fletcher asked us 
to commit to this very proposition. Stated more generally, jurors 
ought to commit to follow the law (their secret power of nullifica-
                                                                                                
22 Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179, 182-83 (Tex. Crim. App., 2001). These 
issues are controversial, and not limited to criminal cases. See Hyundai Motor Co. 
v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2006). See also SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 
JURY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT 12-14, 150-67 (Sept. 1997). 
A 
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tion notwithstanding). But “where the law does not require the 
commitment, a commitment question is invariably improper.”23 
Sounds good, but the line is hard to draw. Was it an improper 
commitment question when Ms. Fletcher asked each juror the fol-
lowing? 
It is very black and white what we are talking about, right[?] He 
either violated the rule or he didn’t, there is no gray area that 
we are talking about. When we are talking about following 
rules and regulations, it is either you are pregnant or not. It is 
not very. So that’s what we are talking about, so the verdict is 
guilty. So my question to you is: If the State of Texas proves to 
you beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated the rule, what-
ever the rule or regulation was, whatever we have alleged in 
our indictment, could you return a verdict of guilty, could you 
prove it to us beyond a reasonable doubt no matter what you 
thought about the rule itself, whether you thought the rule was 
stupid or silly or trivial, could you return a verdict of guilty if 
he violated that rule[?] 
On the one hand, Ms. Fletcher appeared to ask simply whether 
we could follow the law. Did we understand that we were jurors, 
not legislators (or, God forbid, activist jurors)? The indictment 
charged possession of a cellphone, which was apparently prohibited, 
and thus our task appeared to be simple. Did he have one? Was it 
prohibited? Case closed. 
On the other hand, her question had a lengthy predicate. It was 
asked only after the jury pool had been polluted by her prolix and 
opinionated descriptions of this law, its “scientific” basis, and its in-
tricate sequence of hearings, rulings, and orders. Weren’t we being 
asked to commit to Ms. Fletcher’s view of how the law operated, 
that is, asked to “resolve … an issue a certain way after learning a 
particular fact”,24 the very definition of an improper commitment 
question? We were not just asked if we could follow a “stupid or 
silly or trivial” law – clearly a legitimate commitment question. We 
                                                                                                
23 Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 181.  
24 Id. at 179. 
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were asked to accept the prosecution’s view of the law as a clear-cut 
series of black-and-white rules, and commit to a worldview that 
seemed to brook no exceptions. Did committing to follow the law 
require us to commit to Ms. Fletcher’s version of it? 
Mr. Nicholson never objected, so Judge White never ruled 
whether the question, asked seventy-seven times, was improper. 
Mr. Nicholson never objected because he wanted to impress his 
own views, and ask for similar commitments. Were we required to 
commit to either view of the law? Is it unreasonable to wonder 
about the effect of such coercive commitments, made in the pre-
trial fog of unknowing, once the evidence is in and deliberation be-
gins? 
THE APPEAL TO FALSE AUTHORITY 
he appeal to false authority is a fallacy of logic old enough to 
have a Latin name: argumentum ad verecundiam.25 Anyone who 
watches television is familiar with it: Ed McMahon was no expert 
on health insurance; Bob Dole no expert on Viagra; and no one 
whose visage has ever graced the front of a box of Wheaties – from 
Mary Lou Retton to Tiger Woods – is an expert on bland breakfast 
cereal. But few Americans have escaped the tug of their blandish-
ments to do (or, more often, buy) something because they have en-
dorsed it. As the most entertaining book on fallacies summarizes 
this one: 
The fallacy lies in the introduction of material that has no bear-
ing on the matter under discussion. … The attempt to make 
our own opinions yield before such spurious authority is trad-
ing on our respect for position and achievement, and trying to 
use this instead of argument and evidence.26 
Of course, a genuine expert’s opinion is fine support for an argu-
ment, as rules of evidence recognize.27 But you don’t have to be a 
                                                                                                
25 In Texas, this is better known as the “All-Hat-No-Cattle” fallacy. Pronunciation 
varies. 
26 MADSEN PIRIE, THE BOOK OF THE FALLACY: A TRAINING MANUAL FOR INTELLEC-
TUAL SUBVERSIVES 177 (1985). 
27 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
T 
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brain surgeon (or is it a rocket scientist?) to recognize that expertise 
should not be expanded beyond its due. The lepidopterist is helpful 
with butterflies, not biometrics.  
Both attorneys knowingly appealed to false authority to bolster 
their positions with confirmation by an “expert.” To my horror, I 
discovered that I was the false authority. When Ms. Fletcher’s So-
cratic dialogue about the purpose of civil commitment did not go 
smoothly with the first few jurors, she turned to the law professor 
for support: 
MS. FLETCHER: No, that is different than the adult protective 
services. It is very different from that. Who can venture as to 
why we have it? Mr. Kahn – 
MR. KAHN: Yes. 
MS. FLETCHER: – you are a law professor, surely you know 
about civil commitment a little bit. Can you venture to guess 
why we have civil commitment in the State of Texas? 
I tried to duck the question: “Well, as a law professor, my specialty 
is rather narrow. I don’t think anything I might say about civil 
commitment has any weight since it is not my specialty.” But Ms. 
Fletcher was persistent: 
MS. FLETCHER: What do you teach? 
MR. KAHN: Constitutional law. 
MS. FLETCHER: One of my favorite law [school classes]. 
What do you think? 
MR. KAHN: I think it could be a variety of different reasons 
for civil commitment. And that commitment in this context 
might be commitment in the sense commitment away from the 
society. 
MS. FLETCHER: And why would the legislature – 
MR. KAHN: Rather than a promise of a particular person in 
the sense of committing to do or not to do. 
I had just made the mistake of trying to correct the misimpression 
expressed earlier by a fellow juror. Ms. Fletcher sought to turn my 
equivocation to her advantage: 
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MS. FLETCHER: So you believe in this context, it is a context 
away from society? 
MR. KAHN: That is not what I said, Ms. Fletcher. 
MS. FLETCHER: Okay. 
MR. KAHN: What I said was, that it could have a variety of – 
MS. FLETCHER: Right, so what do you believe it is in this 
context? 
MR. KAHN: I am not sure. 
MS. FLETCHER: When we are talking about sexually violent 
predator[s]? 
MR. KAHN: I am not quite sure because it is not my specialty 
and I would rather not venture to guess where I might be 
wrong. 
Mr. Nicholson also sought support from my false authority. He 
asked each juror how Ms. Fletcher’s repeated use of “sexually vio-
lent predator” possibly “impacts you in terms of your ability to be 
[a] fair and impartial juror.” My turn came. 
MR. KAHN: I believe I could be a fair and impartial juror. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. That sounds like a law professor, 
just a straightforward answer, this is it. Taking everything into 
account, I want to know the label and what impact you feel like 
you have. Because you obviously can see this with a dozen con-
stitutional law issues that exist and are obviously being liti-
gated. My question is how does the label itself impact you as 
you sit here right now before you heard any testimony at all? 
I didn’t like his suggestion that I shared his view that the statute was 
constitutionally infirm. So I decided to express what I had been feel-
ing since Ms. Fletcher’s examination: 
MR. KAHN: Well, Mr. Nicholson, I have to say that I am very 
concerned at the risk of answering that question. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. 
MR. KAHN: Because both you and Ms. Fletcher have now 
drawn attention to my profession.  
MR. NICHOLSON: Right. 
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MR. KAHN: Which I put on that [jury questionnaire] to an-
swer truthful[ly]. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. 
MR. KAHN: But in the course of our two days together I have 
already been approached by my fellow jurors who are asking 
me questions about the law, and two of them are with regard 
to this case. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. 
MR. KAHN: Now, you mentioned when you came in here that 
you [have] got quite a lot of experience in the law and that nev-
ertheless this voir dire was something unusual to you. And I 
have to say it is unusual to me and I am very concerned that the 
label law professor has been thrown around in order for me to 
somehow attach my professional answer to it. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Sure. 
MR. KAHN: Which to me is as dangerous as asking a dentist 
about your kidney. 
Mr. Nicholson was too good an attorney to be rattled by an unruly 
juror. He pushed back in defense of voir dire, Texas-style: 
MR. NICHOLSON: Well, the funny thing is in terms of my 
question, I am asking about the label of sexually violent preda-
tor and what’s your opinion of it. And I haven’t gone into any 
legal questions and I am not asking you to give a testimony to 
the jury about constitutional law or what you think of this law, 
I am not going there with you. I don’t think it is appropriate 
and it could prejudice and bias the jury.  
But what I do want to know, first of all, is this your first time 
being involved in a voir dire process[?]  
MR. KAHN: As a juror, that’s correct. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Now, part of our job is to question the ju-
rors about their personal feelings about things. And the fact 
that I see some sensitivity because you are a law professor – we 
do that with everybody’s occupation. If you are a marshal like 
Ms. Mancini, or if you work at the D.A.’s office like Ms. 
Cheswick, we take all of those things into consideration. Okay. 
That’s part of what we do. My job as a representative of his 
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rights is to know what everybody does for a living and how it 
applies to this case. Because people’s biases and beliefs and 
feelings are all part of their background and what they do for a 
living. And if you don’t think that being a constitutional law 
professor has a significant impact on your view on the civil 
commitment law in this case, I mean, that’s part of this proc-
ess, that’s why we do that. 
MR. KAHN: Well, I am new to this jurisdiction. But I have to 
say that I find it peculiar that my profession was named by Ms. 
Fletcher. But when you questioned Ms. Mancini and Ms. 
Cheswick, you did not mention their profession[s]. So although 
[I] agree that you are not asking questions about the law and I 
agree that my profession may well have an influence on how I 
would come to this case. My concern is that [by] repeatedly 
mention[ing it,] my influence is different than that of my fellow 
jurors and I think my influence should be the same. 
MR. NICHOLSON: And I can tell you realistically that is not 
reality because the truth of the matter is [lawyers sit on juries] 
down here all the time, Mr. Bromden is a lawyer as well, he is 
a civil lawyer and that has come up during the voir dire proc-
ess. And the fact of the matter is, attorneys tend to have more 
influence in deliberations because of their profession and their 
expertise than lay people. 
MR. KAHN: I agree. But I feel that my influence would have 
been lesser just as Ms. Mancini and Ms. Cheswick were not 
frequently referred to. I know I would not refer to it. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. 
MR. KAHN: But to answer your question, the substantive 
question. I believe that I could be an impartial juror in that I 
would be able to approach the issues that I am asked to answer 
by complying with my oath to be open minded and fair and 
impartial. 
MR. NICHOLSON: Thank you.  
On one level, Mr. Nicholson’s question was perfectly legiti-
mate. He needed to probe each juror’s true feelings to do his job 
well. But that wasn’t why he engaged me that way. He saw an op-
portunity for support for his view that the law was impossibly 
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vague, maybe unconstitutionally so. But I had no wish to be any-
body’s expert, let alone foil. 
Reader, you already have guessed that, unlike my fellow citizens 
seated ahead of and behind me, I was not invited to sit in the jury 
box.  
CONCLUSION 
he transcript for State v. McMurphy begins in all capital letters, 
“BE IT REMEMBERED,” as if to emphasize its important re-
cording purpose. These words capture the dilemma of the voir dire 
that it memorialized: just how much information should we jurors 
retain from it? Put another way, does a voir dire left largely in the 
hands of the advocates, rather than filtered by the judge, leave ju-
rors with memories that should be forgotten, but cannot? 
Like Texas Tea, voir dire soaked the venire in strange spirits, 
stirred us up, and then let us steep. I could not help but wonder 
whether such a process fortifies the jury poured from it with irrele-
vant information that would never have been admissible at trial. 





                                                                                                
28 2 oz bourbon whiskey; 2 oz gin; 2 oz rum; 2 oz tequila; 2 oz triple sec; 2 oz 
vodka; 2 oz sweet and sour mix; Coca-Cola. Fill a pitcher with ice. Add all ingre-
dients except Coca-Cola. Stir, add Coca-Cola, stir again. Serve with ice. Not 
recommended before jury duty in most jurisdictions.  
T 
